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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALAN C. THOMSON 
ERNEST L. WILKINSON 
and SIDNEY M. HORMAN 
' 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
A'P'PeUants, 
GEORGE J. CONDAS, NICK 
J. CONDAS, CHRISJ. CONDAS 
MARY CONDAS LEHMER, ' 
ELLENCONDASBAYASwd 
ALEXANDRA CONDAS 
OCKEY, 
Defendants and 
Respondents 
Case No. 
12,458 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Action by plaintiffs to establish a public 
thoroughfare across defendants' lands in Summit 
County, Utah, and for damages claimed to have 
resulted from defendants' alleged interference with 
plaintiffs' use thereof. By way of Counterclaim, 
defendants sought to quiet title to their lands free 
and clear of all claims of a public thoroughfare, and 
for damages against plaintiffs for trespass. The 
issue on this appeal is limited to whether the trial 
court erred in finding no public thoroughfare. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
By their Complaint plaintiffs sought to esta-
blish that the upper road across defendants' lands 
' known as the Quarry Road, is a public road, and to 
recover damages for alleged interference with plain-
tiffs' use thereof. Defendants deny that a public 
road had been established across their property, and 
by their Counterclaim sought to quiet title to their 
lands free and clear of such claims and for damages 
against plaintiffs for trespass. Pursuant to a pre-
trial conference, the only issue tried was whether 
the roadway in question was a public thoroughfare 
and all issues relating to damages, both on plaintiffs' 
Complaint and defendants' Counterclaim, were 
reserved for trial at a later date (R. 217, 226). That 
issue was tried by the court sitting without a jury, 
and upon the conclusion of the evidence plaintiffs 
filed a Motion To Amend their Complaint pursuant 
to Rule 15 (b) U.R.C.P. to include in their pleadings 
the Lower Road, asking that it be declared a public 
highway (R. 197, 198). Plaintiffs' Motion To 
Amend was granted (R. 214) over defendants' 
objections (R. 195, 196). Thereafter the trial court 
made and entered its Findings Of Fact and Conclu-
sions Of Law (R. 217-223, incl.) and Judgment 
( R. 226, 227) of "no cause of action" on plaintiffs' 
Complaint and quieting defendants' title to their 
property free and clear of all claims that either the 
Quarry Road or the Lower Road is a public road and 
that both are private roads and that plaintiffs have 
no possessory interest therein. Upon entry the Judg-
ment became final except as to defendants' Counter-
claim for damages against plaintiffs, which was 
reserved for trial at a later date (R. 227). No 
objection has been made by plaintiffs to that proce-
dure, either in the court below or on this appeal. 
Plaintiffs then filed a Motion For New Trial (R. 
213), which was denied (R. 231). Thereupon plain-
tiffs filed their Notice Of Appeal ( R. 235) . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents (defendants) seek on this appeal 
to affirm the Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of 
Law and Judgment made and entered by the trial 
court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents (hereinafter referred to as defend-
ants) cannot agree with appellants' (hereinafter 
ref erred to as plaintiffs') Statement Of Facts in 
their Brief because the facts are there stated for the 
most part in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, who 
lost below, and in so doing violates the time honored 
rule that the facts on appeal must be reviewed in the 
light most favorable to the Findings and Judgment 
below. Furthermore, plaintiffs attack the Findings 
Of Fact generally as not conforming to the evidence, 
with no attempt to specifically point up wherein such 
Findings do not conform. And so defendants believe 
it not only proper but essential that a Statement be 
made setting forth the facts of the case as found by 
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the trial court and as supported by the evidence with 
the foregoing rules in mind. 
Defendants are the owners of approximately 80 
acres of land situate in Summit County as successors 
in interest of the original patentee under patent issu-
ed by the United States of America dated October 23, 
1931(Fdg.1, R. 218; Exh. P-7, page 16). In the year 
1928 there existed across the southerly portion of 
defendants' lands the remnants of an abandoned 
railroad spur track bed which entered from the west 
and coursed southeasterly through the southerly 
portion thereof, terminating in several stone 
quarries situated to the north and east ( Fdg. 2, R. 
218; Tr. 11, 12, 176, 181, 185, 308, 309). 
In 1928 there also existed an unimproved dirt 
road, hereinafter designated as the Lower Road, 
which commenced at Highway U-248 to the west of 
defendants' lands and followed an easterly course 
along the abandoned railroad bed, entering defend-
ants' lands from the west, and thence turning south, 
crossing said abandoned railroad bed within but 
near the west line of defendants' lands and thence 
continuing easterly along the base of Quarry 
Mountain along the north side of an old fence line 
through swampy areas and terminating at an 
abandoned rock house and out-buildings associated 
with the operation of the stone quarries during years 
prior thereto (Fdg. 3, R. 218, 219; Tr. 11, 184, 185, 
268, 335). 
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In 1929 defendants' predecessor constructed a 
steel post and wire stock fence along the west line of 
defendants' property across the abandoned railroad 
bed and a gate was constructed in the fence across 
the Lower Road immediately below its crossing of 
the abandoned railroad bed (Fdg. 4, R. 219; Tr. 21, 
22, 23, 177, 178, 220, 221, 261, 310, 311). In 1930 
defendants' predecessor converted the abandoned 
railroad bed into a crude roadway which he used to 
haul sheep wagons and supplies in his sheep opera-
tion (Tr. 313, 314). In 1931 additional minor 
repairs were made by one Halloway in exchange for 
permission to take and haul stone from the quarry 
on defendants' property, and the stock fence was cut 
and a wire gate installed across the bed to permit 
his passage (Fdg. 5, R. 219; Tr. 32, 33, 309, 311, 
312). 
In 1932 two posts were erected on each side of 
the converted railroad bed on defendants' property 
approximately 150 feet east of the fork to the Lower 
Road and a cable or chain was stretched between 
said posts and was equipped with a lock which 
physically obstructed and blocked the roadway to all 
vehicular traffic except to defendants' predecessors 
in interest and others who had a key to the lock. The 
purpose thereof was to prohibit unauthorized 
persons from using the Quarry Road and to prevent 
pilfering and the hauling away of quarried stone by 
persons unknown. At approximately the same time 
"Keep Out" and similar warning signs were 
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attached to the cable or chain (Fdg. 6, R. 220; Tr. 
26,27,28,221,223,315,316). 
During the entire period from 1932 to and 
including the year 1958 two posts with a cable or 
chain equipped with a lock and stretched across the 
Quarry Road were maintained at the approximate 
same location. On a number of occasions the posts 
were pulled out, but were always replaced upon the 
discovery at approximately the same location. Inter-
mittently during that period a large boulder was 
placed in the roadway near the chain or cable during 
the fall of the year and was removed during the 
following spring. During the same period "Keep 
Out" or similar warning signs were maintained, 
attached to the cable or chain or to the post. During 
the whole of the period from 1932 to and including 
the year 1958 the locked cable or chain stretched 
across the Quarry Road and periodic placing of the 
boulder effectively obstructed the roadway to all 
vehicular traffic except to those lessees of the 
quarries who had keys to the lock and to defendants' 
predecessors in interest who either had a key or access 
to one (Fdg. 7, R. 220; Tr. 28, 31, 32, 84, 85, 86, 91, 
190, 191, 195, 196, 198, 199,200,202,208,221,222, 
223, 243,244, 251,265,273,274,290,291,315,316, 
319). 
During the spring of 1959 the posts and chain 
were moved from the prior location farther up the 
roadway and were also there equipped with a lock to 
prevent unauthorized persons from circumventing 
the locked cable or chain at its prior location. The 
posts, with the locked chain stretched across the 
roadway, were maintained at that location contin-
uously from 1959 until 1967 after plaintiffs 
acquired their property, and during that entire 
period constituted an obstruction to all vehicular 
traffic beyond that point except to lessees of the 
quarries who had keys and to defendants and their 
predecessors who either had a key or access to one 
(Fdg. 8, R. 221; Tr. 87, 95, 244, 275, 320, 321). 
During the period from 1931 to 1966, inclusiYe, 
the use of the Quarry Road was limited to the 
private use of defendants and their predecessors in 
interest for the haulage of their sheep wagons and 
supplies and moving their sheep in their sheep opera-
tions and the private use of the lessees of the stone 
quarries as ingress and egress thereto and for the 
intermittent hauling of stone therefrom, all with 
the consent and permission of the defendants and 
their predecessors in interest. During that period 
there was an occassional sight-seer or hunter who 
used the roadway when the chain was temporarily 
down and who of necessity returned on the same road 
since such roadway terminates at the quarries and 
does not connect with any passable road, nor does it 
lead to any point of public interest (Fdg. 9, R. 221; 
Tr. 19, 32,40, 93, 179, 181, 188, 199,204,208,229, 
246,250,252,266,277,292). 
In the year 1931 the width of Quarry Road was 
approximately 8 feet. During the period from 1931 
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until 1966, inclusive, the surface of Quan·y Road 
was intermittently repaired and maintained by 
defendants' predecessors in interest and the lessees 
of the quarries, resulting in the widening of parts 
thereof to a maximum width of 12 feet. That at no 
time did Summit County or the Utah State Highway 
Department ever repair or maintain the bed or sur·· 
face of Quarry Road (Fdg. 11, R. 222; Tr. 94, 95, 
146, 196,200,225,227,283,288,321,322). 
Prior to 1931 the use of the Lower Road was 
limited to intermittent private use of the lessees of 
the quarries and their employees as a means of 
ingress and egress to the quarries and the rock house 
and out-buildings associated therewith and to the 
owners of property immediately to the south thereof. 
In addition thereto the Lower Road was then used 
by an occasional hunter or fisherman. That from 
1928 to 1931 the Lower Road was used by defendants' 
predecessors in interest in their sheep operations, 
and after 1931 the use of the Lower Road was 
limited to intermittent use by defendants and their 
predecessors in interest in their sheep operations and 
to the private use of owners of farming property 
immediately to the south thereof and to an occasional 
hunter or fisherman (Fdg. 12, R. 222; Tr. 215, 257, 
274,280,283,292,328). 
That neither the Quarry Road nor the Lower 
Road was used during any period of time by the gener-
al public as a public road or thoroughfare, and there 
is no evidence that defendants or their predecessors 
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in interest intended to dedicate or abandon either 
road across their property to the use of the public, 
and both roads presently are and at all times haye 
been private roadways (Fdg. 13, R. 222). 
On the basis of the foregoing Findings Of Fact, 
the trial court entered its Judgment of "no cause of 
action" on plaintiffs' Complaint and quieting 
defendants' title to their property free and clear of 
all claims that either the Quarry Road or the Lower 
Road is a public road. 
POINT I. 
UNDER THE CARDINAL RULES OF REVIEW 
THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND JUDG-
MENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IN THIS CASE 
MUST BE AFFIRMED. 
Plaintiffs attack the Findings Of Fact gener-
ally as not conforming to the evidence, without 
specifying which Findings and without attempting 
to specifically point up wherein such Findings 
do not conform to the evidence. In Charlton v. 
Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 360 P. 2d 176 (1961) 
this Court held that in considering such an attack 
on the Findings and Judgment of the trial court it 
is the duty of this Court to follow these cardinal 
rules of review, to-wit: 
( 1) To indulge them a presumption of 
validity and correctness; 
( 2) To require the appellant to sustain 
the burden of showing error; 
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(3) To review the record in the light most 
favorable to them; and 
( 1) Not to ~isturb them if they find sub-
stan trnl support m the evidence. 
As to ( 1) and ( 2) above, plaintiffs have the 
burden on this appeal of overcoming the presump-
tion of validity and correctness. Nowhere in Appel-
lants' Brief do they even attempt to point out where 
the findings of the trial court are in error. They 
simply ignore such findings and purport to sum-
marize generally under three paragraphs under 
Point I of their Brief what they characterize as 
facts developed from uncontroverted testimony. Not 
only is such testimony controverted but the state-
ments set forth therein are fraught with inaccur-
acies, assumptions and bridging over with non-
existent evidence and in part are downright untrue, 
as will be noted hereinafter under Point II of this 
Brief. 
As to (3) and ( 4) above, the evidence outlined 
under respondents' Statement Of Facts with direct 
references to the record and transcript make it 
abundantly clear that the findings of the trial court 
are in fact supported by substantial evidence in the 
record. That being so, the findings of the trial court 
should not be disturbed on this appeal. 
And since the Conclusions Of Law are predi-
cated upon and are supported by the findings, such 
Conclusions must be affirmed. Likewise, since the 
Judgment follows the Conclusions it too must be 
affirmed herein. 
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POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDING 
OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE LOWER 
ROAD IS A PRIVATE ROAD AND NOT A PUB-
LIC THOROUGHFARE. 
At the outset it should be noted that under 
their Complaint plaintiffs sought only to establish 
that the Upper Road or Quarry Road was a public 
road. It was not until after all the evidence was in 
that plaintiffs moved to amend their Complaint and 
pleadings to include the Lower Road. Plaintiffs 
were permitted to so do over defendants' objections, 
with which defendants now have no quarrel since 
defendants are satisfied, as was the trial court, that 
plaintiffs failed to prove the Lower Road to be a 
public thoroughfare. 
Under Point I of their Brief the plaintiffs 
argue that the trial court erred in failing to find 
that there was a public use of the Lower Road. 
Plaintiffs had the burden of proving by clear and 
convincing evidence that the Lower Road had been 
dedicated to the public as a public thoroughfare by 
continuous and uninterrupted user by the general 
public for ten years. Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 
370, 438 P. 2d 545 (1968). The trial court refused 
to so find, and in fact found to the contrary ( Fdg. 
13, R. 222). And the trial court having refused to 
so find the correct rule here is that this Court should 
' 
not upset the trial court's refusal to so find unless 
the evidence is such that all reasonable minds would 
so conclude and thus compel such a finding. Park v. 
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Alta Ditch & Canal Company, 23 Utah 2d 86, 458 
P. 2d 625 (1969). 
Under the record in this case it would be sheer 
nonsense for plaintiffs to argue that the evidence is 
so clear and convincing that all reasonable minds 
would conclude that the Lower Road had been dedi-
cated to the public as a public thoroughfare by 
continuous and uninterrupted user by the general 
public for ten years . Yet that is plaintiffs' burden 1 
on this appeal. We submit that not only do plaintiffs 
fail to meet their burden on this appeal but the 
evidence overwhelmingly shows otherwise. 
Under Point I of Appellants' Brief they make , 
a futile attempt to summarize generally under three 
short paragraphs what they characterize as facts 
developed from the uncontroverted testimony. Not 
only is such testimony controverted but the state-
ments set forth therein contain inaccuracies, 
assumptions and the bridging over with non-existent 1 
evidence. Moreover, such statements are in part 
downright untrue. 
Thus, as to paragraph A on page 6 of Appel-
lants' Brief, it is the use of the Lower Road that is , 
important and not the fact of its existence. Its exist-
ence as a wagon road was established from 1894 to 
1898 (Tr. 334, 335, 337). It terminated at the build-
ings associated with the quarry operations (Tr. 
335). 
The record is devoid of any evidence as to the 
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existence of the Lower Road from 1898 to 1915. In 
1915 the Lower Road existed as a wagon road that 
went up to the quarry (Tr. 184). It did not exist 
beyond the quarry, nor were there any tracks beyond 
the quarry area (Tr. 185). The Lower Road was 
washed out around the hill in the spring run-off 
and winter snows kept it pretty well gutted with 
little trenches (Tr. 188). 
The evidence as to the existence of the Lower 
Road after 1915 is unclear until the year 1926 (Tr. 
105). Thereafter its existence was generally esta-
blished. It was a little, rutty road that separates the 
, , Condas property from the Peterson property (Tr. 
11). When the Condas family first went into the 
area in 1925 or 1926 they attempted to use the 
Lower Road and got bogged down and stuck (Tr. 
308, 329). There is a creek running by the Lower 
Road and over the years the road was inundated half 
. 1 the time and full of pot holes (Tr. 329). It was 
difficult to get through because there were bog holes 
and a good possibility of getting stuck because it was 
always wet and marshy along the fence line (Tr. 
; I 
255, 257). 
In 1929 a board gate made out of scrap lumber 
was constructed across the Lower Road just beyond 
the railroad grade in the fence along the Condas 
west line (Tr. 23, 178, 220, 221, 310). The board 
gate was replaced with a wire gate (Tr. 23, 310). 
The wire gate was maintained thereafter until 1938 
01· 1939 (Tr. 29, 179). The gate obstructed traffic 
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from going along the Lower Road past the fence 
(Tr. 310) and for a period was equipped with a 
chain and a lock in the chain (Tr. 184). 
As to paragraph B on pages 6 and 7 of Appel-
lants' Brief, fifteen to twenty men working the 
quarry, the Wabel family and two Chinese cooks • 
hardly make it a "community". The statement of 11 
plaintiffs' witness McAlevey that 200 men worked ' 
in the quarry at one time (Tr. 97) was a voluntary 
statement made by him as he was stepping down 
from the witness chair, which the trial court 
obviously disregarded since his knowledge of the .. 
area was limited to the period from 1953 to 1962 
1 
(Tr. 81). 
During the period 1894 to 1898 the only evi- , 
dence of the use of the Lower Road was limited to 
the Snyder family visiting with their married 
daughter (Tr. 334, 337) who lived in the cottage 
near the quarry (Tr. 335) and a Snyder boy who 1 
drove pigs along it on one occassion (Tr. 345) and ' 
whatever interferences might be drawn from the 1 
fact that between fifteen and twenty men worked 
in the quarries (Tr. 338) and two Chinese cooks 
worked and slept in the boarding house (Tr. 338, 1 
341). Except for their visits, the witness Snyder · 
could not recall specifically any other individuals 
who used the Lower Road (Tr. 345). There was no 
evidence nor any inferences that the Lower Road 
was used by anyone except those connected with the 
quarry operations. 
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The record is devoid of any evidence of any use 
of the Lower Road from 1898 until 1915 when the 
witness McPolin used it to go up to the quarry where 
he worked and where it terminated (Tr. 189). The 
evidence is unclear from 1915 to 1926 as to what 
use, if any, was made of the Lower Road. The last 
time any rock was moved out of the quarry by the 
railroad was in 1919or1920 (Tr. 176). From 1928 
to 1931 the Lower Road was used by defendants' 
predecessors in their sheep operations (Fdg. 12, Tr. 
328). There was no evidence that the quarries were 
operated thereafter until about 1932. Thereafter 
the use of the Lower Road was limited to the inter-
mittent use by defendants and their predecessors in 
their sheep operations and the private use of the 
owners of farming property immediately to the 
south and to an occasional hunter or fisherman 
(Fdg. 12, R. 222; Tr. 215, 257, 274, 280, 283, 292, 
328). 
As to paragraph C on page 7 of Appellants' 
Brief, the only use of the Lower Road in 1931 and 
1932 for any sheep purposes was for the defendants' 
own sheep (Tr. 327, 329). The statement that the 
Lower Road continues to be used by the public is 
unsupported by any evidence and is simply untrue. 
And so can it be said that such evidence is so 
clear and convincing that all reasonable minds would 
conclude that the Lower Road had been dedicated to 
the public as a public thoroughfare by continuous 
and uninterrupted public user for ten years? Is 
15 
273 P. 2d 720 (1954); Gillmor v. Carter, 15 Utah 
2d 280, 391 P. 2d 426 ( 1964) ; and Petersen v. 
Combe, supra. 
The trial court correctly applied the foregoing 
rule to the facts of this case and found that the 
Lower Road was not used during any period of time 
by the general public as a public road or thorough-
fare and it presently is, and at all times has been, 
used as a private roadway (Fdg. 13, R. 222). We 
respectfully submit that such finding must be 
affirmed. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS 
OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE USE OF 
BOTH THE QUARRY ROAD AND THE LOWER 
ROAD PRIOR TO PATENT DID NOT CONSTI-
TUTE A USE BY THE GENERAL PUBLIC AS 
A PUBLIC THOROUGHFARE. 
At the outset, we are at a loss to understand 
whether plaintiffs make any claim on this appeal as 
) to the Upper or Quarry Road. In their "Relief 
Sought on Appeal" on page 2 of Appellants' Brief 
they seek a reversal of the lower court and to have 
the case rewarded (remanded) for additional evi-
dence describing a right of way over the "Lower 
' Road". Under captioned "Point II" of their Brief 
plaintiffs assert that the use of the Upper Quarry 
Road (and the Lower Road) was established by 
public user and dedication prior to patent. Yet in 
, their agrument of Point II no mention is made of 
the Upper Road or Quarry Road and all references 
therein seem to be directed to the Lower Road. 
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By their own Statement Of Facts on page 4 of 
Appellants' Brief plaintiffs concede that the Quarry 
Road did not exist prior to 1928 or 1929 except as 
an old railroad grade - "kind of a scar on the hill." 
Plaintiffs then concede that the railroad grade was 
thereafter gradually improved and made usable for 
vehicular traffic. The patent to the Condas land was 
issued on October 23, 1931 pursuant to entries made 
prior thereto (Fdg. 1, R. 218). Thus plaintiffs must 
concede that it was impossible for the Quarry Road 
to become a public thoroughfare while the Condas 
lands were still a part of the public domain since the 
Quarry Road did not even come into existence until 
after the year 1929. And so the cases of Lindsay' 
Land & Livestock Company v. Chournos, 75 Utah 
384, 285 P. 646 (1929) and Sullivan v. Condas, 76 
Utah 585, 290 P. 954 (1930) cited on page 10 of· 
Appellants' Brief have no application to the Quarry ' 
Road. Those cases deal with the creation of public 
highways over the public domain and are simply not l 
in point here. 
Nor is the case of Oregon Shortline RailroOJJ 
Company v. Murray City, 2 Utah 2d 427, 227 P. 2d 
78 ( 1954) of any help to plaintiffs here since the 1 
holding there is limited to the proposition that a rail· 
road coul,d acquire a railroad right-of-way under 43 
U.S.C.A. Section 932 for a trans-continental railroad 
constructed between the Act of 1866 ( 43 U.S.C.A. 
Section 932) and the Act of 1875 ( 43 U.S.C.A. 
Section 934}. Here the railroad spur was con· 
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structed after the Act of 1875 ( 43 U.S.C.A. Section 
934) and there is no evidence of any compliance with 
the requirements thereof, i.e. filing a copy of its 
Articles of Incorporation with the Secretary of 
Interior, profile of the railroad, etc. 43 U.S.C.A. 
Section 937. 
Apparently plaintiffs do not claim that the 
Quarry Road became a public thoroughfare after 
patent since their Point II, if in fact it does apply to 
the Quarry Road, does not raise that issue. Further-
more, plaintiffs concede in their Brief, on page 
5 thereof, that from 1934 (actually 1932) until 1959 
, a chain was placed across the Quarry Road and was 
maintained there until 1959 when it was moved to a 
point on defendants' property. 
However, if we are mistaken as to plaintiffs' 
claims we say that the facts are, as found by the trial 
court, that from 1932 to and including the year 1967 
) the Quarry Road was equipped with a locked cable 
or chain which effectively obstructed the passage of 
all vehicular traffic except as to the lessees of the 
quarries and the defendants and their predecessors 
1 
in interest and was posted with "Keep Out" or 
similar warning signs besides being periodically 
blocked with a large boulder (Fdgs. 6, 7, 8; R. 220, 
221). Likewise during the period from 1931 to 1966 
inclusive the use of the Quarry Road was limited to 
the private use of defendants and their predecessors 
in interest for the haulage of their sheep wagons 
and supplies and moving their sheep in their sheep 
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operations and the private use of lessees of the stone 
quarries as ingress and egress thereto and for the 
intermittent hauling of stone therefrom, all with the 
consent and permission of the defendants and their 
predecessors in interest. During that period there 
1 
was an occasional sight-seer or hunter who used the 
Quarry Road when the chain was temporarily down 
and who of necessity returned on the same road 
since such road terminates at the quarries and does 1 
not connect with any passable road, nor does it lead 
to any point of public interest (Fdg. 9, R. 221). 
Those facts as found by the trial court and as 
supported by the substantial weight of the evidence 
1 
make it crystal clear that the Quarry Road was 
never used during any period of time by the general 
public as a public road or thoroughfare and does 
not meet the requirements of Morris v. Blunt, supra, 
nor the line of cases cited thereafter. 
The facts of this case as they relate to the ) 
Quarry Road are closely akin to the facts of Petersen 
'V. Combe, supra. There as here the roadway dead-
ended in the sagebrush and rocks. There as here 
warning signs were posted and the primary use of ) 
the roadway was by the owners adjacent thereto 
and there was nothing of public interest along 
the road. Plaintiffs there as here were subdividers 
of adjoining land and complained that defenda~ts 
had obstructed the use of the roadway by prospective . 
lot purchasers. Similar deficiencies existed in the 
complaints and similar claims of dedication by 
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resolution of the County Commissioners and by 
official maps permeated both cases. In Petersen 
1'. Combe, supra, this Court rejected the very 
1 same arguments as were advanced by plaintiffs 
herein, and its conclusion as set forth on page 380 
of the Utah Reports we submit is dispositive of this 
case to-wit : 
"We think the procedure and facts of this 
case are pretty much controlled by the follow-
ing cases: Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 
P. 1127 (1916); Hall v. No. Ogden City, 109 
Utah 325, 175 P. 2d 703 ( 1946) ; Thompson v. 
Nelson, 2 Utah 2d 340, 273 P. 2d 720 (1954); 
Gillmor v. Carter, 15 Utah 2d 280, 391 P. 2d 
426 (1964); and by the fact that plaintiffs, 
by their own witnesses and evidence, actually 
supported the defendants' contentions that 
the taking of the property must be proved by 
clear and convincing evidence that constitu-
tionally must be justified, and that the burden 
of proof to justify such conclusion has not 
been borne here." 
The facts relating to the Lower Road both prior 
and after patent are covered in our argument under 
) the foregoing Point II and need not be further dis-
cussed here. Suffice it to say plaintiffs wholly failed 
to sustain their burden in the trial court of establish-
ing the Lower Road as a public thoroughfare by 
clear and convincing evidence or at all as they have 
have failed to sustain their burden in this Court of 
showing error by the trial court. 
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We respectfully submit that the Findings Of 
Fact, Conclusions Of Law and Judgment of the trial 
court must be in all respects affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOSEPH NOV AK 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Respondents 
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